The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces an acute strategic crisis characterised by multi-front asymmetric coercion, energy export disruption, and shifting regional alliances. As the war involving Iran, Israel and the United States takes unpredictable turns, Tehran appears to be leveraging its “Axis of Resistance” to impose mounting economic and security costs on Riyadh. In this context, Houthi forces in Yemen have seized critical Red Sea chokepoints around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, imposing a blockade on Saudi shipping. Simultaneously, Iranian-aligned Shia militias in Iraq have targeted Saudi Arabia’s overland energy bypasses.
Together, these pressures expose Riyadh’s vulnerabilities. Washington’s reluctance to intervene directly has opened space for Israeli intelligence and missile-defence overtures, potentially complicating Saudi normalisation calculations and testing the newly established Mecca Pact with Türkiye and Pakistan.
Operational Dynamics: Bab al-Mandab, Mecca Incidents, and Asymmetric Fronts
The operational situation along Yemen’s Red Sea coast has shifted dramatically following the Houthis’ recent offensive. Houthi forces overran Mocha, Dhubab, the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands, and Perim (Mayyun) Island, establishing military control over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Controlling this bottleneck—through which 12 per cent of global trade passes—the Houthis declared a blockade on Saudi shipping. Crucially, Houthi leadership engaged in calculated ambiguity, assuring the US via Omani backchannels that non-Saudi commercial vessels would enjoy unhindered transit. This tactical distinction insulates the Houthis from broader Western military intervention while concentrating pressure on Riyadh.
Cross-border aerial strikes have further exposed Saudi vulnerabilities. Houthi ballistic missiles and drones have repeatedly struck targets across Saudi Arabia, including Aramco facilities, Yanbu port, King Khalid Air Base at Khamis Mushait, Abha, Jazan, and Taif. Tensions spiked following reports of intercepted projectiles near Mecca. While Saudi authorities condemned these incidents as targeting Islam’s holiest sanctuary, Houthi officials issued formal denials, maintaining that targeting remains limited to military and energy assets.
This southern threat is synchronised with a northern front. A drone strike by Iranian-aligned Iraqi militias turned off Saudi Arabia’s East-West Petroline pipeline. Because this pipeline carries nearly four million barrels per day to Yanbu to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, its shutdown, combined with the Bab al-Mandeb blockade, has severed Saudi Arabia’s main alternative crude export corridors. This asymmetric pincer squeeze directly threatens Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 agenda, freezing oil loadings at Yanbu and depleting Saudi air defence interceptors.
The convergence of threats across Hormuz, the Petroline and Bab al-Mandab reveals a structural vulnerability: disrupting several routes simultaneously can impose costs greater than any single attack.
Yet, simultaneous pressure does not necessarily imply unified operational command. Iran-aligned actors possess different political priorities, degrees of autonomy and relationships with Tehran. The strategic significance of these attacks lies partly in their cumulative effects: even without direct coordination, disruptions across multiple fronts can constrain Saudi Arabia’s military options, increase the economic costs of confrontation and complicate its ability to identify an appropriate response. Establishing whether these operations constitute a centrally directed Iranian campaign or a convergence of aligned interests is therefore essential to understanding the nature of the threat.
Leverage Politics: US Hesitation, Israeli Overtures, and the Abraham Accords Dilemma
Saudi Arabia’s crisis has exposed growing strategic friction with Washington. Despite direct requests from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to US President Donald Trump for military strikes against advancing Houthi forces, Washington declined direct combat involvement. Preoccupied with Iran, constrained by munition shortages, and reluctant to enter a Yemeni ground war, the US restricted its support to intelligence and targeting assistance. US backchannel contacts with the Houthis to safeguard American shipping have further heightened Riyadh’s sense of exposure.
Washington’s hesitation created a strategic opening for Israel. According to sources, quiet security dialogues were initiated between Israeli and Saudi intelligence officials through US Central Command (CENTCOM). Israel offered Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support, threat mapping, and potential air defence integration.
This dynamic can reflect a deliberate strategy for leveraging. Washington and Tel Aviv appear to be seeking to leverage Saudi security vulnerabilities to advance formal normalisation under the Abraham Accords. By linking key bilateral benefits, including a US-Saudi civil nuclear deal, security commitments, and F-35 sales, to joining the Accords, US and Israeli strategy seeks to compel Saudi flexibility. However, Riyadh faces a delicate political dilemma. Saudi leadership remains bound to its requirement of progress toward Palestinian statehood before formal normalisation. This means that open diplomatic normalisation remains politically constrained.
Strategic Disruption: The Mecca Pact and Regional Resistance (Israel, Iran, UAE)
Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of greater strategic autonomy has broadened its security options. To this end, Riyadh signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026. Treating an attack on one member as an attack on all, the pact seeks to establish a regional defence framework that complements existing US military capabilities while reducing dependence on a single security provider.
However, the Houthi offensive and northern militia strikes have tested the alliance at a very early stage, before its institutional structures, coordination mechanisms, and joint command arrangements have had time to develop fully. As a newly established agreement, the pact will require time to translate its political commitment into functioning military and institutional mechanisms.
Its immediate challenge is to turn political commitments into responses suited to asymmetric threats. Attacks by non-state actors complicate attribution, proportionality and mutual-defence thresholds. Credibility will depend on intelligence-sharing, integrated air defence, maritime security and joint planning—not military intervention alone.
On 19 September, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed Ankara’s willingness to meet Saudi military needs, particularly through technical assistance, and rejected descriptions of the pact as a “paper tiger”. From its end, Pakistan has said military action against the Houthis is not under consideration. The pact must, therefore, reconcile deterrence with consultation procedures that prevent members from being drawn into unwanted conflicts.
Meanwhile, Regional responses to the pact differ:
- Israel views the Mecca Pact with scepticism, seeing an independent Sunni alliance as an obstacle to a US-Israeli-led regional security structure. By rushing to offer intelligence to Riyadh, Israel seeks to demonstrate the pact’s operational limits and position itself as the primary security provider for Gulf states.
- Iran has responded to the Mecca Pact cautiously, with some officials and hardline commentators expressing concern about its potential to strengthen regional coordination against Tehran. At the same time, the ongoing proxy pressure in the region could serve to test the pact’s ability to provide immediate protection and potentially encourage Riyadh to pursue pragmatic political and maritime arrangements.
- The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has reservations about Riyadh’s growing alignment with Ankara and Islamabad. Already strained by competing interests in southern Yemen, Saudi-Emirati relations face renewed tensions following the Houthi takeover of Bab al-Mandab. The offensive exposed the collapse of forces commanded by Tareq Saleh, Yemen’s vice-president and a longstanding Emirati ally whose National Resistance Forces were built with substantial UAE support before his subsequent realignment with Riyadh. The defeat has revived mutual suspicions and accusations over responsibility for the collapse of Yemen’s western front.
Strategic Outlook & Implications for Regional Architecture
The crisis surrounding Yemen and the Red Sea has escalated beyond a local security challenge for Saudi Arabia, becoming a critical stress test for the Middle East’s emerging security architecture. Persistent threats from Iran-aligned actors against Saudi territory, maritime routes, and critical energy assets—such as the East-West pipeline—demonstrate how localised disruptions rapidly amplify broader regional vulnerabilities.
If existing protections prove inadequate, Israeli security assistance could become more attractive, although Riyadh’s Palestinian-statehood condition continues to constrain formal normalisation.
The Mecca Pact faces a different test: whether it can develop useful defensive capabilities and credible consultation mechanisms quickly enough to address Saudi security needs.
Complicating matters is the calibrated nature of the Houthi campaign. By disclaiming strikes on holy sites like Mecca while targeting energy and logistics hubs, the campaign seeks to sustain asymmetric pressure without provoking full-scale regional confrontation. This dynamic also fuels competing narratives regarding which regional actors might politically leverage Riyadh’s heightened sense of vulnerability.
Further complicating Gulf calculations is the role of the United States. Direct friction with Iran and attacks across the region have highlighted Washington’s hesitance to assume direct military costs on behalf of partners, despite Saudi appeals. The takeaway for Gulf capitals is not to discard the American partnership, but that overreliance on a single external guarantor creates dangerous gaps during crises.
The diplomatic dimension of this emerging security architecture was evident at a US-led meeting with Türkiye and Arab leaders on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on 22 September. President Trump publicly praised President Erdoğan, while Erdoğan emphasised the participating countries’ efforts to address the Gulf’s mounting challenges. The meeting highlighted the continuing importance of US engagement alongside Türkiye’s growing role in regional diplomacy, although no concrete security commitments were announced.
Consequently, Riyadh is adopting a layered, multi-track strategy: sustaining ties with Washington, developing the Mecca Pact, and engaging other regional players. The resolution of this crisis will ultimately determine whether the region transitions toward an autonomous, locally anchored security framework or reverts to relying on established external and Israeli-led security structures.
