Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi’s visit to Ankara strengthened the strategic partnership between Ankara and Baghdad at a time when the Middle East remains consumed by conflict and uncertainty. Türkiye and Iraq are increasingly building their relations around connectivity, economic integration, and shared prosperity.
From a regional politics perspective, al-Zaydi’s visit reduced uncertainty about Iraq’s post-election foreign policy trajectory. Following the formation of the new cabinet, some analysts speculated that the momentum achieved under Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani could slow amid Baghdad’s shifting domestic priorities. Yet the latest deals in trade, logistics, energy, sports, and education suggest that Türkiye–Iraq cooperation has become increasingly institutionalised rather than dependent on individual governments. Both recognise that long-term economic cooperation offers a more sustainable foundation for regional stability than short-term political calculations.
More importantly, the relationship is gradually moving from cooperation towards interdependence. Transport corridors, energy infrastructure, and expanding trade create material interests dependent on bilateral stability. Governments may change, and disagreements persist, but the economic costs of disruption become progressively higher for both sides. The emerging partnership should therefore be understood not simply as diplomatic rapprochement, but as an attempt to embed bilateral relations in a durable architecture of shared interests.
One of its most tangible manifestations is the Development Road Project. Extending nearly 1,200 km from the Grand Al Faw Port on Iraq’s Persian Gulf coast to Türkiye’s Ovaköy border crossing and onwards to European markets, the $20 billion project will integrate highways, railways, and logistics centres into a multimodal transport network capable of reshaping regional trade flows.
The MoU on railway and highway transportation through the Fishkhabur-Ovaköy border crossing marks another step towards this vision. Ankara and Baghdad aim to link Iraq’s emerging logistics network with Türkiye’s transportation infrastructure and, ultimately, European supply chains. Once operational, the Development Road could provide a faster and more resilient Gulf–Europe trade corridor.
However, geography alone will not guarantee success. The project depends on sustained financing, timely construction, harmonised customs and border procedures, security along the Iraqi route, and sufficient commercial competitiveness to attract freight from established maritime and overland alternatives. Its significance should therefore be measured not only by infrastructure constructed, but by whether Ankara and Baghdad can build the regulatory, financial, and security architecture required to turn physical connectivity into sustained trade flows.
Its importance has grown as global trade routes become increasingly vulnerable and connectivity itself becomes weaponised. Since October 7, Houthi attacks have disrupted Red Sea shipping, while tensions and militarisation around the Strait of Hormuz continue to expose the fragility of maritime trade. Nearly 90% of global trade travels by sea, while around 30% of global container traffic passes through the Suez Canal. Rerouting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope has added up to 14 days to Asia–Europe shipping times, increasing freight costs, risk premiums, and delivery times.
The strategic case for the Development Road should not, however, assume that overland connectivity can replace maritime trade. Its value lies in optionality. States and companies increasingly seek alternative routes that reduce exposure to individual chokepoints. Even if the corridor captures only a fraction of Gulf–European trade, its availability during periods of maritime insecurity could enhance Iraq and Türkiye’s strategic and commercial relevance. Connectivity is increasingly about building redundancy into a vulnerable global trading system rather than identifying a single optimal route.
The Development Road therefore reflects a broader Turkish foreign policy vision that prioritises connectivity over confrontation and economic cooperation over geopolitical fragmentation. Rather than bloc-based or zero-sum competition, Ankara seeks regional initiatives capable of generating shared economic gains.
The project also complements Türkiye’s broader connectivity strategy. Linking Iraq’s transport network with the Middle Corridor would strengthen Türkiye’s position as a connector between the Gulf, Asia, and Europe. As regional actors seek to diversify supply chains away from vulnerable chokepoints, Türkiye is emerging not simply as a transit country but as a key regional logistical node.
Energy cooperation constitutes the second major pillar of bilateral relations, gaining momentum following President Erdoğan’s Iraq visit in April 2024. The Iraq-Türkiye Crude Oil Pipeline, with a capacity of approximately 1.6 million barrels per day, has long served as Iraq’s major northern export channel through Türkiye’s Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan.
Restoring pipeline flows would benefit both countries. For Iraq, reopening the route would diversify exports and reduce transportation risks. For Türkiye, it would reinforce Ankara’s growing role in regional energy markets alongside infrastructure such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, TANAP, and TurkStream—an advantage of particular relevance amid the EU’s post-Ukraine push for energy diversification.
Prime Minister al-Zaydi’s visit therefore signifies more than the multisectoral deals signed in Ankara. It demonstrates that Türkiye and Iraq increasingly view their relationship through a long-term strategic lens. In a region characterised by persistent instability, both are seeking to anchor their relationship in connectivity, trade, energy, and economic cooperation.
The deeper significance of the emerging partnership lies not in any individual agreement, pipeline, or railway, but in the attempt to make economic interdependence itself a source of regional stability. If the Development Road and renewed energy cooperation succeed, Türkiye and Iraq could demonstrate an alternative logic for a region historically organised around security competition: one in which connectivity creates strategic interests in stability rather than merely benefiting from it.
