After decades of shadow confrontations with Israel and the United States—punctuated by occasional cooperation, such as during the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)—Iran entered the summer of 2025 amid direct clashes with Israel and an intensifying hybrid war.
For the first time since the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran found itself under sustained foreign bombardment on its own territory. The twelve-day war of 2025 was marked by high-level assassinations and coordinated strikes targeting critical military installations and the country’s nuclear infrastructure. The plumes of smoke rising over Tehran and other major cities symbolised not only tangible military setbacks but also signaled profound uncertainty about the regime’s future stability
Iran’s long-standing ‘axis of resistance’ strategy has sustained a major setback, with the permanent loss of key regional allies like the Assad regime and the diminished operational capacity of others, such as Hezbollah. This damage was compounded by a deepening economic crisis and growing social unrest within the country.
There have been long-standing expectations of change in Iran, but recent developments have intensified debates over whether this will occur through external intervention or via a leadership transition within the regime. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump have recently sent tacit and explicit messages advocating regime change in Iran.
In contrast to analyses that emphasise external factors, a leadership transition within the existing Iranian political structure appears more probable than regime change imposed from outside.
Velayat-e Faqih: The Backbone of the Regime
Velayat-e Faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist) is the ideological and administrative framework underpinning the Islamic Republic of Iran. Developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, this system envisages that, during the occultation of the 12th Imam in Shi’a belief, a cleric (faqih) assumes political and religious leadership over society. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Khomeini enshrined this model in the constitution, elevating the supreme leader to the position of the country’s most powerful authority akin to the Pope in medieval times.
Today, velayat-e faqih is not only a religious institution but also a structure that exercises political, military, and judicial power, shaping Iran’s domestic and foreign policy alike.
Ali Khamenei, elected to succeed Khomeini after his death in 1989, did not hold a prominent position within the religious hierarchy at that time. However, he emerged as a figure who could “guarantee the continuity of the regime” under the prevailing circumstances. Since taking office, he has consolidated control over the Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary, the media, and other key institutions.
Khamenei’s leadership has faced significant challenges in recent years, with the 2009 Green Movement, the 2019 economic demonstrations, and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests all intensifying public opposition.
Ultimately, while direct confrontations with Israel and the United States—along with explicit threats to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—indicate that change may be on the horizon, it is unlikely to unfold in the manner many outside observers anticipate.
As Narges Bajoghli, Associate Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, aptly noted: ‘This was one of the most serious security breaches in the regime’s history, but it wasn’t a turning point. The leadership held, the streets stayed quiet, and the system proved again that it’s built not for popularity, but for survival.’ In this light, any potential transformation is likely to originate from within the regime itself, making the question of Khamenei’s successor as consequential as the future of the velayat-e faqih system.
The Future Faces of Iranian Leadership
The age and health problems of the 86-year-old religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have kept succession discussions alive for a long time. Following recent clashes, these debates have gained momentum, with the names of Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, and the grandson of the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, Hassan Khomeini, coming to the fore.
Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, assassinated by the US, had been a powerful figure thanks to his loyalty to Khamenei and his influence across the region. However, Soleimani’s death removed a significant contender to the leadership. Similarly, the death of former President Ebrahim Raisi, known for his conservative profile, in a mysterious helicopter crash, eliminated another critical figure from consideration. In addition, the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, a significant figure in Iran’s regional strategic network, further narrowed the pool of charismatic leaders.
According to Reuters, Israeli attacks in Iran and assassination threats against Ayatollah Khamenei have accelerated the long-standing succession process, leading to the formation of a secret three-member committee to oversee it.
Although Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has largely stayed out of the public spotlight, he is often regarded—within certain political circles—as a figure capable of ensuring continuity within the existing regime.
Mojtaba Khamenei’s potential candidacy presents a complex and delicate proposition. On the one hand, his relative youth and presumed familiarity with the aspirations of Iran’s emerging generation, combined with strong ties to the newer generation within the IRGC, have positioned him as a figure of interest—both within certain power centers in Tehran and, perhaps speculatively, among external actors such as the U.S. and Israel, who may view him as more pragmatic or pliable.
On the other hand, the prospect of a father-to-son succession carries significant risks. It could provoke internal unease by challenging the principle of meritocratic legitimacy within the velayat-e faqih system, and may deepen divisions with reformist factions already critical of dynastic tendencies in the Islamic Republic’s leadership structure.
Another mentioned candidate is Hassan Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson, who leans towards a more moderate and reformist stance, has attracted support among parts of the population thanks to his criticism of poverty and social injustice. However, his reformist identity makes him less acceptable to hardline factions in Iran, particularly the Revolutionary Guards.
Pressure to Weaken the Regime?
Israel’s attacks last month dealt heavy blows to Iran’s nuclear programme and military infrastructure. Also, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s explicit reference to regime change as a goal and his statements about assassinating Khamenei have increased the pressure on Tehran.
President Trump further applied pressure as illustrated by his post on his Truth account — ‘We know exactly where the so-called Supreme Leader is hiding. He is an easy target, but is safe there — we are not going to take him out (kill)!’ — can be considered part of a broader strategic approach.
Espionage activities within Iran and Israel’s targeted assassination operations have once again exposed significant security vulnerabilities within the regime. Meanwhile, attacks on military sites and critical infrastructure like the South Pars gas field, together with war costs, are likely to deepen the country’s economic crisis.
A New Mohammed bin Salman?
A possible change of leadership in Iran may not simply mean a change of name; it can also mark the beginning of a new chapter in the regime’s internal power balance. For example, in Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) maintained a relatively low profile before coming to power. However, as soon as he came to power, he moved swiftly to curtail the influence of religious institutions, while westernising the the country and plugging it into the global capital.
Similarly, it is suggested that if Mojtaba Khamenei, who has so far remained in the background, were to assume leadership, he might, as a younger figure, soften some of the regime’s ideological rigidity and open the door to economic reforms and limited dialogue with the West.
Such transformation would necessitate significant shifts in both Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, easing restrictions on women’s rights while following the Roman Emperors’ formula for appeasing their poorest citizens, namely “bread and circuses,” could ensure the regime’s longetivity. Externally, focus would be placed on economic cooperation and integrating Iran’s economy with the West.
Undenably, there are significant obstacles to such a change. It remains unclear how flexible the velayat-e faqih system — the ideological backbone of Iran — can be, but given the wide powers at the hands of the Supreme Leader, this is not a scenario to be discarded.
In sum, Iran appears to be entering one of the most turbulent chapters in its modern history. Mounting pressure from Israel and the United States, the erosion of regional alliances, internal unrest, and economic decline have brought the country to a critical juncture. With Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advanced age accelerating the succession process, the prospect of political transformation within the velayat-e faqih system is becoming more tangible. Mojtaba Khamenei, often seen as the frontrunner to succeed his father, could follow a trajectory akin to Mohammed bin Salman—consolidating power while recalibrating the regime’s posture.
Given what’s at stake, the outcome of this succession will reverberate far beyond Iran, shaping regional stability and global energy security alike.
