The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) ruling of 19 November 2026 that Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya Muslims marks a historic milestone, not only for a people who have long sought justice but also for international law’s capacity to confront genocide. The judgment’s significance extends beyond the judicial recognition of past atrocities. It carries profound implications for other communities facing similar devastation, particularly Palestinians in Gaza, and for the security narratives invoked by Israel to justify its military operations.
What Happened?
The predominantly Muslim Rohingya population of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, bordering Bangladesh, has endured decades of systematic discrimination, political exclusion and grave human rights violations. Myanmar’s refusal to recognise the Rohingya as a legitimate ethnic community, portraying them instead as migrants from Bangladesh, laid the foundations for their institutionalised marginalisation. The 1982 Citizenship Law effectively rendered most Rohingya stateless, while successive restrictions severely curtailed their access to education, healthcare, employment, marriage and freedom of movement.
Intercommunal violence in 2012 displaced thousands of Rohingya, confining many to segregated camps. Military operations intensified in 2016 before reaching unprecedented levels of brutality in August 2017. Following attacks on security posts by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on 25 August, Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, launched extensive operations across northern Rakhine. Presented by the authorities as counterterrorism measures, these so-called ‘clearance operations’ rapidly evolved into a systematic campaign of violence against the Rohingya civilian population.
Mass executions, widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence accompanied the destruction of hundreds of villages. Estimates indicated that at least 10,000 people were killed, while more than 750,000 Rohingya fled to neighbouring Bangladesh. Cox’s Bazar subsequently became home to one of the world’s largest refugee settlements, transforming mass displacement into a protracted humanitarian crisis.
Described by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as a textbook example of ethnic cleansing, the atrocities prompted international investigations. In 2018, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar concluded that the scale and systematic character of the violence, alongside discriminatory state policies and hate speech, provided compelling evidence of genocidal intent.
With the support of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), The Gambia instituted proceedings against Myanmar before the ICJ on 11 November 2019, alleging violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Myanmar’s then de facto civilian leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, appeared before the Court to contest the allegations. In January 2020, the Court ordered provisional measures to protect the Rohingya before dismissing Myanmar’s preliminary objections in July 2022, paving the way for proceedings on the merits.
A Landmark Judgment: From Genocide to State Responsibility
By nine votes to six, the ICJ found that Myanmar had committed genocide against the Rohingya during its 2017 military operations in northern Rakhine. For the first time in its history, the Court held a state directly responsible for committing genocide.
Having confirmed that the Rohingya constituted a protected group under the Genocide Convention, the Court established that three of the five acts enumerated in Article II had been committed: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.
Crucially, the Court’s assessment extended beyond the death toll. It considered the proportion of the protected population targeted, the psychological suffering inflicted upon survivors, particularly victims of sexual violence, and the consequences of such violence for the Rohingya community’s reproductive capacity.
The judgment’s most consequential legal dimension, however, concerns the establishment of genocidal intent –dolus specialis-. What distinguishes genocide from other international crimes is the specific intent to destroy, physically or biologically, a protected group, in whole or in part. Even widespread atrocities do not, in themselves, necessarily establish genocide.
Assessing the systematic character of the violence, the selective targeting of Rohingya civilians, widespread sexual violence, attacks against children and longstanding discriminatory policies, the Court concluded that genocidal intent constituted the only reasonable inference from the evidence. Myanmar’s counterterrorism narrative proved insufficient to explain the totality of its conduct.
Myanmar’s responsibility was not confined to the commission of genocide. The Court also established violations of its obligations to prevent genocide committed by civilians acting alongside security forces, punish perpetrators, enact the necessary domestic legislation and preserve evidence pursuant to the provisional measures ordered in 2020.
Myanmar was required to cease continuing violations, ensure accountability, provide guarantees of non-repetition, facilitate the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced Rohingya, and make reparation for the harm inflicted.
The judgment represents a significant development in international jurisprudence. In its 2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia judgment, the ICJ recognised the Srebrenica genocide but held Serbia responsible for failing to prevent genocide and punish its perpetrators, rather than for its direct commission. In Myanmar’s case, genocidal acts committed by state organs directly engaged the state’s international responsibility.
Furthermore, The Gambia’s ability to invoke Myanmar’s responsibility despite not being directly injured demonstrates the practical significance of the Convention’s erga omnes partes obligations. Preventing and confronting genocide is a collective legal concern extending beyond directly affected states and communities.
From Myanmar to Gaza: Two Peoples, the Same Genocide
The implications of the Myanmar judgment are particularly significant for South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. Although each case must be assessed on its own merits, striking parallels emerge in the scale of destruction, patterns of violence, official justifications and indicators of genocidal intent.
Foremost among these parallels is the invocation of counterterrorism. Just as Myanmar maintained that its operations targeted ARSA rather than the Rohingya, Israel insists that its military campaign following the 7 October attacks targets Hamas rather than the Palestinian people, invoking its right to self-defence.
The Myanmar judgment, however, establishes a crucial distinction: genocidal intent can coexist with other objectives. The existence of a genuine security threat or a legitimate military objective does not necessarily preclude genocidal intent. Accordingly, even accepting Israel’s stated objective of dismantling Hamas would not, in itself, negate the possibility that its government simultaneously intends to destroy Palestinians in Gaza, in whole or in part.
Counterterrorism constitutes no exception to the prohibition of genocide, nor can self-defence provide a legal basis for destroying a people.
Another significant parallel concerns the historical context in which genocidal intent is assessed. Rather than examining the 2017 atrocities in isolation, the Court considered Myanmar’s military operations against the Rohingya in 1978 and 1991–92, alongside decades of institutionalised discrimination, exclusion from citizenship and persecution.
The same contextual approach is indispensable in Gaza. Palestinian suffering did not begin on 7 October 2023. Decades of occupation, forced displacement, dispossession, unlawful settlement policies and the blockade imposed on Gaza since 2007 constitute an essential backdrop to the present devastation. Indeed, in its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, the ICJ itself recognised the systemic discrimination arising from Israel’s restrictions across the occupied Palestinian territory.
Equally important is the recognition that evidence of genocidal intent need not be confined to the acts enumerated in Article II. In Myanmar, the destruction of Rohingya property, demographic transformation and the obstruction of displaced communities’ return contributed to the Court’s assessment of intent.
Applied consistently to Gaza, these considerations strengthen the argument that Israel has acted with genocidal intent. The killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians, repeated mass displacement, extensive destruction of homes, hospitals, schools and essential infrastructure, and restrictions on food and humanitarian assistance indicate a campaign undermining the very conditions necessary for Palestinian physical survival in Gaza.
Moreover, the assessment need not rely exclusively on inferences drawn from conduct. Statements by senior Israeli political and military officials dehumanising Palestinians, attributing collective responsibility to civilians and legitimising Gaza’s destruction provide further evidence relevant to establishing genocidal intent.
The Myanmar judgment does not predetermine the outcome of South Africa’s case, which remains subject to independent judicial assessment. Nevertheless, consistent application of the Court’s reasoning provides a compelling legal foundation for establishing Israel’s international responsibility.
Conclusion
The historic significance of the Myanmar judgment lies not merely in recognising genocide, but also in establishing a legal framework for confronting comparable atrocities elsewhere and reinforcing the responsibilities that extend beyond the courtroom. While establishing state responsibility represents a major legal development, the effectiveness of such a ruling ultimately depends on compliance, accountability and meaningful remedies for affected communities. The same considerations apply to Gaza, where the credibility of international law will be measured not only by the Court’s eventual findings, but also by the willingness of states and international institutions to uphold their obligations under the Genocide Convention. Consistency therefore demands more than the application of common legal standards; it requires their effective enforcement, irrespective of the political influence or strategic alliances of the states concerned.
Accepting as military necessity in Gaza what has been recognised as evidence of genocidal intent in Myanmar would fundamentally undermine the coherence and credibility of international law. Ultimately, the universality of the prohibition of genocide derives not simply from its judicial recognition, but from its consistent application, irrespective of the perpetrator’s identity, political alliances or security narratives.
