

DISCUSSION PAPER

Palestinian Reconciliation: Is an End to the Conflict in Sight?

Elif Zaim

TRT WORLD research centre

DISCUSSION PAPER

Palestinian Reconciliation: Is an End to the Conflict in Sight?

Elif Zaim

TRT WORLD research centre

© TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PUBLISHER

TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE

MAY 2020

WRITTEN BY

ELİF ZAİM

COVER PHOTO

AHMED GAMIL - ANADOLU AGENCY

DESIGN BY

EKREM US

TRT WORLD İSTANBUL

AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347

ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ

İSTANBUL / TURKEY

TRT WORLD LONDON

PORTLAND HOUSE

4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4

LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM

TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C.

1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036

WASHINGTON DC

www.trtworld.com

researchcentre.trtworld.com

The opinions expressed in this discussion paper represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre.

Introduction

In September 2019, in his annual speech at the United Nations General Assembly, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas pledged to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza after 13 years. Although there have been numerous other calls for elections before, the process failed each time due to the ongoing conflict between the two key Palestinian parties, Fatah and Hamas. The rift between the two leading factions began after the victory of Hamas in 2006 elections and Fatah's refusal to recognise the results. The violent clashes that occurred in the following year led to a division of rule, whereas Hamas took over Gaza and Fatah gained control of the West Bank, paralysing Palestinian politics to this day.

There are enough reasons to be sceptical that the elections will be held any time soon. Even in a scenario in which elections take place, uncertainties remain. For example, what will happen if Hamas wins, will there be a similar deadlock with Fatah, will Israel and the rest of the international community accept the election results this time? In case of Fatah's victory, will Hamas back down in Gaza and allow unity in governance?

In light of the renewed discussions regarding potential elections, this paper examines the reasons behind the division between Fatah and Hamas. Highlighting points of contention, it argues that reconciliation is urgent due to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza and disillusionment in West Bank. However, while it discusses several factors such as popular protests, the emergence of a political party that can challenge the status quo, the ways in which regional actors play into the Palestinian issue in the face of regional developments and resistance against Israeli occupation, particularly after the announcement of the so-called 'deal of the century', which could initiate rapprochement between the factions, it concludes that chances are slim based on the failure of previous efforts.

An Anticipated Conflict?

In January 2005, in the first presidential election held after the death of Yasser Arafat, the candidate of the Fatah party Mahmoud Abbas became the new Palestinian President by winning more than 60 per cent of the vote (Abrams, 2019). The parliamentary elections which took place the following year caught many by surprise as Hamas, which has been designated as a terrorist organisation both by the United States and the European Union (EU) (Jeffrey 2006), was elected by a decisive victory with securing 74 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) (Pina, 2006, 10). Fatah, which had been the key player dominating the political scene for decades, became the second party by only gaining 45 seats (Ibid.).

There were several reactions to the election results which decisively shaped the upcoming developments (Asseburg, 2007, 3). Firstly, while Hamas immediately approached Fatah to create a national unity government, when the latter rejected the proposal, Hamas elected Ismail Haniyeh as the new prime minister and formed the cabinet by itself (Berti, 2015, 12-13). Secondly, the Middle East Quartet composed of the US, Russia, EU and the United Nations (UN) announced that if Hamas did not recognise Israel, accept of previous agreements, and renounce violence, financial assistance would be halted to the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Morro, 2007, 2). As Hamas refused to comply with the conditions, the US and EU imposed sanctions through the suspension of aid to the new Palestinian government (Ibid.). Finally, Israel also ceased handing out tax revenues which are collected on behalf of the PA (Brown, 2015), increasing the financial pressure on Hamas.

In the aftermath of the formation of the government, tensions began to escalate particularly when the Interior Minister Said Siyam wanted to reform the security sector and bring the respective forces under the authority of the Hamas led cabinet (Cavatorta and Elgie, 2010, 35). Despite the move being constitutional, when President Abbas responded by placing the security establishment under his direct control by virtue of being the head of the National Security Council, Hamas, in turn, formed its own security services (Ibid.). Thus, as a result, there have been two distinct security forces with loyalty to competing factions, deepening the separation between Fatah and Hamas (Berti, 2015, 14). More importantly, in the wake of this development over the course of the following months, there were a number of deadly armed clashes between the two (Swart, 2019, 9).

In this regard, the 10th of June 2007 was the beginning of the worst showdown between the two factions with killings on both sides, leading to fierce violent clashes across the Gaza Strip (International Crisis Group, 2007, 11,12). According to the estimates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), at least 116 people were killed and over 550 were wounded over the course of five days (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2007). By June 15th, the military confrontation was over, and both the security and the government institutions within Gaza were under the total control of Hamas (Milton-Edwards, 2008, 1587). According to Hamas, the takeover was a step taken to ensure the survival of the democratically elected government in the face of Fatah's efforts to topple the regime through the use of force (Ibid. 1588). However, for President Abbas, the act was a coup d'état and he reacted by declaring a state of emergency, dissolving the parliament and appointing a new prime minister (Urquart, Black and Tran, 2007).

The battle of Gaza resulted in the division between Fatah and Hamas which lasts until today. Since then, there have been two competing centres of power one in the West Bank and one in Gaza. Thus, the existence of separate governmental institutions, security forces, and even constitutions continue to undermine the possibility of having a united political strategy (Miller 2019).

An Impossible Reconciliation?

For any discussion about the reconciliation efforts, it is important to briefly sketch out what are the major differences between the two parties. To begin with, even though they have opposing views, both Fatah and Hamas seek to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, encompassing the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (Al-Masri, 2014). However, while both are nationalist movements, Fatah which was founded by Yasser Arafat in early 1950s has a secularist orientation and Hamas, founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yasin in the late 1980s, has an Islamist character (Tahhan, 2017). Moreover, they have fundamentally different approaches in how they have come to resist the Israeli occupation. Whereas Hamas rejects Israel and advocates armed resistance, Fatah not only recognises Israel but also embraces negotiations (Ibid.).

Since the 2007 split, there have been six reconciliation agreements between the two factions (2007 Mecca, 2008 Sana'a, 2011 Cairo, 2012 Doha, 2012 Cairo again and 2014 Gaza) all failing to solve the deadlock. While the main focus of these efforts has been the re-establishment of Palestinian Authority's control in the Gaza Strip (Rahman, 2019, 6), there have been several other points of contention. One of them has been holding new elections after the expiration of the four-year mandate for both the presidency and the parliament. Another question was Hamas's participation into Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and reforming the organisation (Tuastad, 2013) since the PLO is formally recognised as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" uniting different factions within the context of pursuing national liberation (Rahman, 2019, 3). Finally, the disarmament of Hamas and



Head of the Political Bureau of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh (3 R) attends reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah, in Gaza City, Gaza on December 05, 2017. (Mustafa Hassona - Anadolu Agency)

the integration of its security forces under the control of the PA have been a key obstacle (Cook, 2017).

Within this framework, the latest attempt to reach a deal of rapprochement was in 2017. Due to the shifting dynamics on the ground, there had been a certain degree of optimism that this time the chances of success were more likely (Elgindy, 2017). For Hamas, already facing an Israeli/Egyptian blockade, bearing the brunt of governance was becoming more and more costly (Asseburg, 2017, 2-3), especially after the introduction of punitive measures by the PA such as cutting down the salaries of civil servants, reducing medical services and holding back payments to Israel for supplying electricity. For Hamas, reconciliation with Fatah was seen as the sole option as a way out of this crisis (Ibid.). On the other hand, President Abbas re-engaging in the talks had an important personal aspect. He wanted to curb the increasing influence of his long-time rival Mohammad Dahlan in negotiations who was ousted from Fatah on treason and corruption allegations (Swart, 2019, 17-8). Moreover, the decreasing popularity of Abbas accompanied with the support for the reconciliation efforts both by Egypt and the United States, had been increasing the pressure on the President to put an end to the split (Asseburg, 2017, 3-4). However, despite the hopes, the initiative failed just like in the previous attempts as neither side was genuinely willing to give up on the power or control they had (Rahman, 2019, 2).

Why is Reconciliation Urgent?

Gaza: A Humanitarian Crisis

Palestinians living in Gaza have suffered the most as a result of the rift between Fatah and Hamas (Swart, 2019, 5). While Gaza had already been under siege for decades, after 2007 as a response to Hamas' takeover, Israeli actions deteriorated the situation in various ways, leading to a near-total collapse of the coastal enclave (Smith, 2019). Ever since, the ongoing blockade described as a 'collective punishment' (OHCHR, 2018) has been severely affecting almost all the aspects of the daily lives of Gazans.

Restrictions on movement and goods have been the key components of the ongoing Israeli siege. In terms of movement, while Israel allows leave permits in 'exceptional humanitarian cases' encompassing mainly medical patients, their companions and selected businessmen (Human Rights Watch, 2018), since 2017 even some patients in life-threatening conditions have been denied of travel unless they were to get treatment abroad due to being related to Hamas members (Hass, 2018). On the other hand, Israel also blocks the entry of many vital goods such as medical equipment or construction material based on 'dual-use' arguing that these could also be used for military purposes (UNSCO, 2017, 9).

In addition to the siege, Israel has waged three wars on Gaza (2008, 2012, 2014), claiming self-defence to protect Israeli citizens against the rocket attacks fired by Hamas (Shlaim, 2019). However, these were indiscriminate assaults on unarmed civilians and civilian infrastructure (Ibid.). For example, in the last military offensive in 2014, over 2,000 Palestinians were killed and 11,000 were wounded (OCHA, 2015). Moreover, almost 18,000 houses were heavily destroyed or demolished completely, leading to around 100,000 displaced people (OCHA, 2018).

It is not only Israel that was reacting to the takeover by Hamas, but the Fatah dominated PA also took certain measures. In 2017, as mentioned earlier, the PA took a series of other actions to pressure Hamas. Not only it slashed the salaries of the PA civil servants by a third, but it also enforced around 6,000 people to early re-

tirement (Khoury, 2017). The move affected the tax revenues received by Hamas which it was using to pay the salaries of its employees (Reuters, 2017). The PA also refused to pay for the electricity supplied by Israel. After the cut residents of Gaza started to receive only three to four hours of electricity during the day, which UN warned that it would result in a total collapse of basic services including health, water and sanitation (Aljazeera, 2017). Even though the PA had been trying to pressure Hamas to cede control of the territory, it had been the Palestinians of Gaza who had been suffering the most as a result of these unjust punitive measures.

West Bank: A Lack of Legitimacy

The division between Fatah and Hamas paralysed the whole political system through hindering the formation of an accountable government in the absence of elections (Rahman, 2019, 5). In this atmosphere, in the West Bank, Abbas has gradually monopolised power under his mandate by securing control over the institutions and eliminating his opponents (Ibid). One of the most significant steps taken by Abbas in this regard was his announcement to dissolve the parliament based on a decision taken by the Constitutional Court in December 2018. Since the court was established by Abbas himself (Munayyer, 2019), the move was seen as a further attempt by the President to expand his grip on power and sideline his rivals (Hammad, 2019). Following this step, in March, Abbas also appointed a prominent official in Fatah and known critic of Hamas, Mohammad Shtayyeh, as Prime Minister (Wermenbol, 2019).

Along with lack of representation, corruption and suppression of dissent have been other factors contributing to the eroding credibility. In the eyes of many Palestinians, senior PA officials are involved in various corrupt practices from embezzling public funds to taking bribes in return of services (Hass, 2016). Lately, there have been ongoing protests across West Bank about a newly introduced social security law which required private-sector employees to pay around 7 per cent of their salaries for a social security fund (Anadolu Agency, 2018). With the main slogan 'thieves, thieves, a gang of thieves', wary of corruption, the main demand of the demonstrators has been transparency (Al-Waara, 2019). That being said, criticism against PA is not always welcome by the authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2018, 23-49). Most recently, in 2018, Palestinians protestors demanding the PA to lift sanctions imposed on Gaza were suppressed by the security forces, who deployed stun grenades and tear gas (Hawari, 2018).

That being said, it is not only internal politics that undermines the legitimacy of the Palestinian government but also the partner-occupier relationship with Israel (Rahman, 2019, 5). Since the Oslo Accords, the PA has been cooperating with the Israeli authorities in almost every field from security to the management of civil affairs affecting all aspects of the daily lives of Palestinians. According to the agreement, the West Bank is divided into three areas A, B and C. In the areas of A and B, full and partial control of the territory is under the mandate of Palestinian Authority respectively. While both areas combined make up almost 40 per cent of the West Bank, they are composed of 165 scattered fragments throughout the territory (B'tselem, 2016). In area C, on the other hand, Israel is in total charge of the economy, security and civil affairs (Aljazeera, 2019). However, despite these divisions, in reality, Israel perpetuates sovereignty over the whole territory (Rahman, 2019, 9). To give an example, when a baby is born in the West Bank, it needs to be registered with Israeli authorities to be granted a birth certificate, an identity card or a passport, since all of these are issued by the Israeli state, not the PA itself (Ibid.).

Moreover, due to the ongoing security cooperation with Israel, the PA can ensure the safety of Palestinians neither in terms of their lives nor property. In 2019 alone, more than 20 Palestinians were killed and over



Source: Passia

3,500 were injured by the Israeli forces in addition to almost 4,000 people including minors who were arrested in Israeli raids in the West Bank (OCHA, 2019). The incursions are coordinated with the Palestinian security as they retreat their forces in advance from the particular area before Israeli soldiers enter (Middle East Eye, 2019), deepening the resentment against PA among Palestinians. The PA also prohibits any type of legitimate public protests or other initiatives which could challenge Israel's occupation to comply with its security obligations (Rahman, 2019, 7). Thus, In the eyes of many people, these policies make the PA complicit in the repression of Palestinians (Barghouti, 2020).

Is Reconciliation Possible?

Despite numerous initiatives, reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah has so far not gone beyond mere rhetoric as none of the consecutive agreements have been implemented. Today, with the hostility and mistrust between the parties remaining as high as ever, no solution is in sight especially with regards to the main points of contention such as the re-establishment of the PA's mandate over Gaza, uniting security forces and reforming the PLO. Neither side is willing to back down on their respective strategies as they both keep using their positions as points of leverage. That being said, even though chances of reconciliation seem slim if not impossible, there can be several internal and external factors that may arguably initiate a change in the status quo.

Popular demonstrations could push the parties to come to the table as we have seen previously. In 2011 the year of the Arab Uprisings, thousands of Palestinians also took to the streets in peaceful protests



Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (C) makes a speech during the weekly cabinet meeting in Ramallah, West Bank on February 3, 2020. (Thaer Ghanaim / Palestinian Presidency / Handout - Anadolu Agency)

throughout the occupied territories. Besides showing solidarity with their counterparts, protestors also demanded the termination of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of unity between Fatah and Hamas (Bargouti, 2020). The mounting pressure resulted out of these non-affiliated protests paved the way for the adversaries to come together to sign a reconciliation agreement in Cairo (Urquhart and Sherwood, 2011). Thus, it can be argued that if Palestinians could start another mass mobilisation movement, this could once again urge the factions to respond to the popular demands.

Holding office for more than a decade in the absence of elections, both Fatah and Hamas are have become renowned for their failures of in terms of governance. However, despite the existence of more than a dozen political parties ranging from leftists to nationalists, none of them have been able to challenge the dominance of Fatah and Hamas. According to one of the most recent polls when people are asked which parties they would vote for if the elections were held today, Hamas and Fatah still hold the lead despite their waning popularity (Poll No.95, 2019, 12). While independents follow with around 7 per cent, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Palestinian People's Party is favoured only by around 1 per cent (Ibid.). This shows that in the absence of political parties which can break this duality, Palestinians are left with no other choice. However, as hard as it may be, if a political party can emerge providing a comprehensive programme that can not only have the support of the people but also recognition from the international community, then Fatah and Hamas could reconsider bridging the divide between them to ensure their political survival.

Besides domestic factors, the ways in which regional players approach the Palestinian issue in light of their interests and rivalries also has an impact on the ongoing split. For example, the rise of Mohammad Dahlan and his central role in the negotiations in 2017 coincided with the blockade against Qatar by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt. Known for his close ties to the United Arab Emirates, it can be argued that the reassertion of Dahlan was a move to reduce the influence of Qatar, which has been supporting Hamas (Gardner, 2017). That being said, the UAE has also been giving extensive financial support to Hamas as part of its agenda to assert its presence in Palestinian affairs (Zaga, 2019). Dahlan's growing role was an important personal incentive for Abbas to once again sit at the negotiation table with Hamas.

Another example of how regional developments have impacted the Palestinian issue and the reconciliation efforts, in particular, can be seen in the way which Arab countries approached US President Donald Trump's 'deal of the century'. The plan is problematic and unacceptable for Palestinians in all aspects, since it recognises Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel and acknowledges Israel's sovereignty over large parts of the West Bank along with Jordan valley, solving its illegal settlements issue in the process. Moreover, the deal puts Israel in complete control of West Bank's security, air space, resources as well as its borders (Rahman, 2020), mandating Palestinians accept Israel as a 'Jewish state' and renouncing their right of return (Buttu, 2020).

Even though the Arab League has rejected the plan, it is known that several Gulf states have been showing a willingness to build relationships with Israel to secure the support of the United States against the perceived Iranian threat (Najjar, 2020). The presence of the ambassadors from Bahrain, the UAE and Oman in the White House when the plan was announced, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit to Oman in 2018, the so-called 'economic peace summit' held in Bahrain can all be seen as examples of how these countries have prioritised their interests over those of Palestinians. Thus, despite the rhetorical support, being aware that the Palestinian plight is compromised, this situation may bring Fatah and Hamas closer in a bid to form a more united front. That being said, so far, besides expressing their willingness to work together (Abu Amer, 2020) amid the crisis, the parties continue to blame each other for delaying strategy discussion meetings (Abu Jahal, 2020).

Conclusion

Since the split in 2007, the disagreements between Hamas and Fatah have been at the heart of the ongoing stalemate plaguing Palestinian politics. While there have been numerous reconciliation attempts brokered by regional actors with the latest round being in 2017, all agreements have failed as neither side has been willing to bridge their differences and to give up on power or control they have. In this regard, the unification of the security forces, reforming the structure of the PLO and bringing Gaza under the rule of the PA have been the key areas of contention.

It is indeed Palestinians who are bearing the cost of the infighting. While Gaza is on the brink of total collapse and frustration in the West Bank is growing each day, reconciliation is urgent not only to end the deadlock but also to be able to confront the Israeli occupation with a united front. Even though both parties are aware of the detrimental effects of the division, due to the continuation of enmity and mistrust between the factions, chances of reconciliation seem highly unlikely if not impossible. That being said, there can be still several factors that can break the ongoing predicament. Mass demonstrations throughout the occupied territories demanding an end to the split, emergence of a political party that can appeal not only to the Palestinian constituency but also get the recognition of international community, the ways in which regional actors approach the Palestinian issue in the face of developments and the need to unite in resistance to confront the Israeli occupation especially with Donald Trump's new peace plan could force Hamas and Fatah to set aside their differences and finally come to an agreement.

Bibliography

Abrams, E. (2019, January 9). Abbas celebrates 14th Anniversary of his Four-Year Term. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/blog/abbas-celebrates-14th-anniversary-his-four-year-term

Abu Amer, A. (2019, 17 January). Will Israel Allow Palestinian Elections in East Jerusalem?. *Al-Monitor*. Retrieved from: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/01/jerusalem-legislative-elections-hamas-fatah-israel.html

Abu Amer, A. (2020, 7 February). US Peace Plan May Unwittingly Unite Palestinians Against it. *Al-Monitor*. Retrieved from: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/palestinian-fatah-hamas-reconciliation-us-peace-plan.html

Abu Jahal, E. (2020, February 25). Hamas, Fatah Trade Blame for Holdup on Gaza Meeting. *Al-Monitor*. Retrieved from: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/hamas-fatah-plo-delegation-meeting-gaza-factions-bilateral.htm

Abu Toameh, K. (2019, October 27). PA Election Officials Arrive in Gaza for Talks with Hamas. *The Jerusalem Post*. Retrieved from: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/PA-election-officials-arrive-in-Gaza-for-talks-with-Hamas-605985

Al-Masri, M. (2014, May 7). United, the Palestinians Have Endorsed 967 Borders for Peace. Will Israel?. *Haaretz*. Retrieved from: https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/will-israel-also-sign-off-on-67-borders-1.5247455

Al-Waraa, A. (2019, January 24). 'There is No Trust': Palestinian Unrest Continues Over Social Security Law. *Middle East Eye*. Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/there-no-trust-palestinian-unrest-continues-over-social-security-law

Aljazeera (2017, June 14). UN warns of Gaza's 'Total Collapse' Amid Power Crisis. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/warns-gaza-total-collapse-power-crisis-170614180853307.html

Aljazeera (2018, December 23). Hamas Rejects Abbas's Plan to Dissolve Palestinian Parliament. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/hamas-rejects-abbas-plan-dissolve-palestinian-parliament-181223101257989.html

Aljazeera (2019, September 11). What are Areas of A, B and C of the Occupied West Bank?. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/areas-occupied-west-bank-190911093801859.html

Anadolu Agency (2018, November 12). Thousands of Palestinians Protest Social Security Law. *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/thousands-of-palestinians-protest-social-security-law/1309157

Asseburg, M. (2007, July). "Hamastan vs Fatahland" A Change for Progress in the Middle East?. *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*. 14. 1-8. Retrieved from: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2007C14_ass_ks.pdf

Asseburg, M. (2017, November). The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation Agreement of October 2017. *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*. 44. 1-7. Retrieved from: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C44_ass.pdf

Barghouti, M. (2020, February 4). Why is the Palestinian Authority Unable to Mobilize its People?. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/trump-plan-palestinian-authority-duplicity-200204103318259.html

B'tselem (2016, June 5). Reality Check: Almost Fifty Years of Occupation. *B'tselem*. Retrieved from: https://www.btselem.org/publications/201606_reality_check

Berti, B. (2015). Non-State Actors as Providers of Governance: the Hamas Government in Gaza between Effective Sovereignty, Centralized Authority, and Resistance. *Middle East Journal*. 69(1). 9-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43698207.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-4946%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3A34da0dfb155f4e386029a6f5c629facd

Brown, N. J. (2015, August 27). Palestinians Fighting and Governing. *Wilson Center*. Retrieved from: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/palestinians-fighting-and-governing

Buttu, D. (2020, February 2). What We Palestinians Think Does Not Matter- All That Matters is Israel. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/02/israel-us-palestine-what-palestinians-think-does-not-matter

Cavatorta F. and Elgie R. (2010, January). The Impact of Semi-Presidentialism on Governance in Palestinian Authority. *Parliamentary Affairs*. 63(1). 22-40. https://academic.oup.com/pa/article/63/1/22/1435241

Cook, J. (2017, October 13). Will Hamas-Fatah Reconciliation Deal Succeed?. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/hamas-fatah-reconciliation-deal-succeed-171013064803703.html

Eldingy, K. (2017, October 9). What's Different About the Latest Palestinian Reconciliation Effort?. *Brookings Markaz*. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/10/09/whats-different-about-the-latest-palestinian-reconciliation-effort/

France 24. (2020, February 1). Palestinian Leader Mahmoud Abbas Suspends Relations with US and Israel. *France 24*. Retrieved from: https://www.france24.com/en/20200201-palestinian-leader-mahmoud-abbas-suspends-relations-with-the-us-israel

Gardner, D. (2017, October 18). Palestinian Accord Reflects the Dynamic of the Middle East. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/655e84ba-b3ec-11e7-aa26-bb002965bce8

Hammad, S. (2019, January 9). Power Grab or Pathway to Polls? Abbas Under Fire for Parliament Dismissal. *Middle East Eye*. Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/power-grab-or-pathway-polls-abbas-under-fire-parliament-dismissal

Hass, A. (2016, April 11). Corrupt Palestinian Officials Too Comfortable to Resist Israeli Occupation. *Haaretz*. Retrieved from: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-corrupt-pa-officials-too-comfortable-to-resist-occupation-1.5429545

Hass, A. (2018, September 13). Sick and Stuck in the Strip: How Leaving Gaza Became Mission Impossible. *Haaretz*. Retrieved from: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-how-leaving-gaza-became-mission-impossible-1.6459485

Hawari, Y. (2018, June 16). Why is Palestinian Authority Attacking Palestinian Protests?. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/pa-attacking-people-gaza-sanctions-180615100149988.html

Human Rights Watch (2018, October). Two Authorities, One Way, Zero Dissent: Arbitrary Arrest and Torture Under the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/palestine1018_web4.pdf

Human Rights Watch (2018). Israel and Palestine: Events of 2018. *Human Rights Watch World Report*. Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/israel/palestine

International Committee of the Red Cross (2007). Gaza and West Bank ICRC Bulletin No.22. Retrieved from: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/israel-palestine-news-150607.htm

International Crisis Group (2007, August 2). After Gaza. International Crisis Group. 68. 1-36. Retrieved from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/after-gaza

Jeffrey, S. (2006, January 26). Hamas Celebrates Election Victory. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/26/israel1

Khoury, J. (2017, July 5). Palestinian Authority Forces 6,000 Gazan Employees into Early Retirement. *Haaretz*. Retrieved from: https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/pa-to-dismiss-6-000-gazan-employees-1.5491829

Lovlie, F. and Ezbidi, B. (2011). In Search of a Palestinian Leadership. *CHR Michelsen Institute*. Retrieved from: https://www.cmi.no/publications/4127-in-search-of-a-palestinian-leadership

Middle East Eye (2020, February 3). Cutting Israel-PA Coordination: The Ace in the Sleeve Mahmoud Abbas Can't Use. *Middle East Eye*. Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/cutting-israel-pa-coordination-ace-sleeve-abbas-cant-use

Miller, A. (2019, November 13). Why No Arab Spring in Palestine?. *Carnegie Endowment*. Retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/11/13/why-no-arab-spring-in-palestine-pub-80329

Milton-Edwards, B. (2008). The Ascendance of Political Islam: Hamas and Consolidation in the Gaza Strip. Third World Quarterly. 29(8). 1585-1599. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20455131.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5747686d73616268db249e943e46d1c8

Morro, P. (2007, May 9). International Reaction to the Palestinian Unity Government. *CRS Report for Congress*. Retrieved from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22659.pdf

Munayyer, Y. (2019, October 20). Abbas Calls for Elections, but will They be Held?. *Lobelog*. Retrieved from: https://lobelog.com/abbas-calls-for-elections-but-will-they-be-held/

Najjar, F. (2020, January 31). Why are the Arab States 'Divided' in the Face of Trump's Plan. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/arab-states-divided-face-israeli-plan-200130190515337.html

OCHA (2015, June 23). Key Figures on 2014 the Hostilities. *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. Retrieved from: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/key-figures-2014-hostilities#_ftn6

OCHA (2018, April 5). 22,000 people in the Gaza Strip still internally displaced from the 2014 hostilities. *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. Retrieved from: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/22000-people-gaza-strip-still-internally-displaced-2014-hostilities

OCHA (2019, 26 December). Protection of Civilians Report: 10-23 December 2019. *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. Retrieved from: https://www.ochaopt.org/poc/10-23-december-2019

OHCHR (2018, July 13). Closure of Gaza commercial crossing: UN expert calls on Israel to reverse decision. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. Retrieved from: https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23375&LangID=E

Oslo II Accords, Annex II (1995, 28 September). Retrieved from: https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/THE%20ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN%20INTERIM%20AGREEMENT%20-%20Annex%20II.aspx

Pina, A. D. (2006, February 9). Palestinian Elections. *CRS Report for Co*ngress. Retrieved from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33269.pdf

Rahman, O. H. (2019, December). From Confusion to Clarity: Three Pillars for Revitalizing the Palestinian National Movement. *Brookings Doha Center Policy Briefing*. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/From-confusion-to-clarity-English.pdf

Rahman, O. H. (2020, February 13). The Real Threat to Palestine is a Crisis of Leadership. *Brookings*. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-cha-

os/2020/02/13/the-real-threat-to-palestine-is-a-crisis-of-leadership/

Reuters (2018, May 3). Anger as Palestinian Authority Cuts Salaries and Pays Late. *Reuters*. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-gaza-salaries/anger-as-palestinian-authority-cuts-gaza-salaries-and-pays-late-idUSKBN1I41LM

Sheizaf, N. (2017, June 28). Decades of Failed Peace Talks: How Israel Negotiates with Itself. +972 Magazine. Retrieved from: https://www.972mag.com/decades-of-failed-peace-talks-how-israel-negotiates-with-itself/

Shlaim, A. (2019, January 9). Ten Years After the First War on Gaza, Israel still Plans Endless Brute Force. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/07/ten-years-first-war-gaza-operation-cast-lead-israel-brute-force

Shlaim, A. (2020, February 17). Palestine and the West: A Century of Betrayal. *Middle East Eye*. Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/palestine-and-west-century-betrayal

Smith, R. (2019). Israel's Permanent Siege on Gaza. *Middle East Research and Information Project*. Retrieved from: https://merip.org/2019/07/israels-permanent-siege-of-gaza/

Swart, M. (2019, March) Palestinian Reconciliation and the Potential of Transitional Justice. *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper*. 25. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Palestinian_Reconciliation_Transitional_Justice_English.pdf

Tahhan, Z. (2017, October 12). Hamas and Fatah How are the Two Groups Different?. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/hamas-fatah-goal-approaches-171012064342008.html

Tuastad, D. (2013). Hamas-PLO Relations Before and after the Arab Spring. *Middle East Policy*. 20(3). 86-98. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mepo.12035

Tzoreff, Y., Michael, K. and Sher, G. (2020, January 15). East Jerusalem and the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections. *The Institute for National Security Studies*. Retrieved from: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/east-jerusalem-and-the-palestinian-legislative-council-elections/

UNSCO (2017, July 11). Gaza Ten Years Later- UN Country Team in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. *United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process*. Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-ten-years-later-un-country-team-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-report/

Urquart, C., Black, I., and Tran, M. (2007, June 15). Hamas Takes Control of Gaza. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/15/israel4

Wermenbol, G. (2019, May 6). Risking It All: The Palestinian Authority Faces Mounting Challenges. *Atlantic Council*. Retrieved from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/risking-it-all-the-palestinian-authority-faces-mounting-challenges/

Zaga, M. (2019, December 18). The Intra-GCC Competition Over the Palestinian Heart. *Middle East Institute*. Retrieved from: https://www.mei.edu/publications/intra-gcc-competition-over-palestinian-heart


TRT WORLD
research
centre

TRTWORLD
research
centre